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is logically an unexceptionable, natural 
human interaction. 
But the term ‘vested interests’ has 
acquired negative overtones of unfair, 
nefarious or anti-social behaviour: that 
is, their successful pursuit, and sometimes 
just their pursuit, is seen as in some way 
damaging. For that reason, and because 
this article does not treat the topic as a 
matter of ethics, it is more useful to talk 
of ‘special interests’, and to distinguish 
legitimate and unexceptional pursuit of 
those interests in an open, democratic 
way from pursuit of them in such a way 
that it injures the general public interest.
The inequalities that matter
In a well-functioning modern democracy 
all citizens are equal members, which 
does not imply equality of outcomes, but 
does imply that there is a general public 
interest in interests not being pursued 
in such a way as to advantage some and 
disadvantage others by creating substantial 
new inequalities, or maintaining or 
exacerbating pre-existing substantial 
In 2010–11 three government policy initiatives aroused 
controversy and accusations of special treatment for ‘vested 
interests’: a change in workplace relations law to meet the 
demands of a film company; special treatment for a company 
in the ultra-fast broadband roll-out; and a gambling-licences-
for-convention-centre deal. Were the accusations justified? 
And what is a ‘vested interest’ and where does it fit in New 
Zealand’s democracy?   
Everyone has interests and expresses and 
pursues those interests in various ways, 
individually and with others who are 
like-minded and directly, or by seeking 
favourable rules or the backing of those 
in authority. In a sense all interests are 
‘vested’, since they are attached to and, 
in a sense, ‘clothe’ the person or entity 
holding or pursuing them. And in an 
open, democratic society, their pursuit 
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inequalities. (In this article ‘citizen’ is 
used generically and includes ‘permanent 
residents’.) Citizens’ equal membership 
extends, since the expansion of social 
services in the 20th century, to being 
‘able to enjoy a standard of living much 
like that of the rest of the community and 
thus … able to feel a sense of participation 
and belonging to the community’ (Royal 
Commission, 1972). 
In practice citizens have inherent 
inequalities, some inherited and genetic, 
some gender-determined, and some 
acquired in the very early years of life, 
and they have attitudinal inequalities 
which determine how they prefer to 
operate in society, including whether 
they are leaders or followers. These 
inequalities are unexceptional elements 
of a normal, diverse human society. But 
there are also manufactured inequalities, 
created – by action or omission – in the 
law and by the state’s practices, by custom 
or social structures and traditions, and by 
economic interaction. Such inequalities 
deny true justice and inhibit citizens 
taking a full part in their society and 
nation. So the focal question in this article 
is: does the successful pursuit of a special 
interest manufacture substantial new 
inequalities or maintain or exacerbate 
existing manufactured inequalities, and 
are those inequalities substantial? If so, 
it is arguably incompatible with true 
democratic practice and in that sense not 
in the general public interest. 
Citizens join together formally 
and informally in interest groups to 
collectively pursue individual interests. 
Unions, business associations and 
political parties are examples. Firms are a 
hybrid: a firm has an individual interest, 
but is also a collective in the sense that 
all those engaged or employed in it have 
an interest in the firm being profitable. 
And citizens form associations such as 
charities and not-for-profit organisations 
to protect or advance the individual 
interests of others less likely to be able to 
pursue their interests without help, and 
to promote animal welfare or protection 
of the physical environment, to seek to 
enhance a suburban or urban landscape, 
or to push for policy change they believe 
will make society or the economy more 
equitable. 
There is nothing inherently injurious 
to the general public interest, as defined 
above, in these activities. If the competition 
is equal, the pursuit of any one interest 
will not reduce the realisation of any other 
interest, more than the realisation of that 
interest is reduced by the realisation of 
others’ interests. Of course, in practice 
some secure more of their interests than 
others, and some inequality of outcome 
is compatible with a just society in a 
well-functioning democracy. It can also 
be argued, (loosely) following John 
Rawls (Rawls, 1972), that if some secure 
an advantage (gain or benefit) through 
successfully pursing their interests, that is 
compatible with a just society if others are 
not disadvantaged. There might also be 
a general acceptance of long-established 
differences – a ‘culture’ – which arguably 
is not necessarily undemocratic.  
But large and persistent inequalities 
of outcomes are not compatible with a 
just society, because then the citizens are 
no longer equal members. Thus, the word 
‘substantial’ is important in assessing the 
impact of the pursuit of special interests. 
How to gain advantage
Richard	Mulgan	(Mulgan,	2004)	identified	
three types of interaction between interest 
groups and governments: a pluralist 
model, in which the political system 
operates like an open market where 
interest groups seek to gain benefits 
from the government but do not control 
decision-makers; corporatism, with 
interest groups formally incorporated 
into the system of government, as when 
wage bargaining was formally regulated 
by the Arbitration Court, and when in the 
1950s	and	1960s	governments	informally	
arbitrated among interest groups, often 
behind closed doors; and a ‘market liberal’ 
model in which the role of the state is 
limited and there is more reliance on 
unregulated choices by individuals and 
private firms in a free market.  
In fact there are few genuinely open 
markets. In almost all markets both 
information and power are asymmetrical, 
usually in favour of larger or more 
concentrated participants and in practice. 
That goes for interest group interaction in 
Mulgan’s	first	model.	And	governments	of	
different parties favour different interests. 
This is only partially and crudely self-
correcting through elections, protests, 
organised campaigns, petitions and so 
on. 
Moreover,	once	a	policy	or	legislation	
is in place it becomes a new status quo, 
and the longer it is in place, the more 
likely it is to become accepted by the 
public as the norm and then not be 
repealed or reversed by a subsequent 
government made up of different parties. 
Thus, the status quo may become part of 
the ‘culture’. 
The corporate model is not in 
prospect. 
national interest versus special interest
A modified version of the ‘market liberal’ 
model was applied by the incoming 
Labour government in 1984. It stopped 
listening to arguments by individual firms 
and sectors (or individuals) for their 
special benefit. The criterion for successful 
arguments put to the government was that 
a change would deliver national benefit. 
This did not mean sector groups or large 
firms stopped pressing cases that were 
beneficial to the sector, firm or individual. 
But it did mean that to gain that benefit, 
a case had to be presented that the benefit 
to the sector/firm/individual was also a 
benefit to the economy as a whole, and the 
case had to argue for generic, not special 
action (though it should be added that the 
In fact there are few genuinely open markets.   
In almost all markets both information and power 
are asymmetrical, usually in favour of larger or 
more concentrated participants and in practice.
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criteria themselves as to what constituted 
national benefit favoured some arguments 
over others).
Broadly speaking, this national benefit 
‘rule’ still applies, but in recent years 
some well-connected individuals or firms 
have persuaded ministers to respond 
favourably to specific cases they have 
made which benefit them directly. They 
have,	in	effect,	finessed	Mulgan’s	interest-
group market. 
•	 In	September	2010	the	Australian	
Media	Entertainment	and	Arts	
Alliance union, backed by several 
international actors’ unions, ramped 
up a bid by New Zealand Actors 
Equity for minimum conditions for 
filming the Hobbit film series. Sir 
Peter Jackson, the director, said these 
claims put at risk Warner Brothers’ 
commitment to the film, and 
specifically to the film being filmed 
in New Zealand: Warner Brothers did 
not want to deal with a unionised 
workforce. After lawyers representing 
Warner Brothers met the minister 
of economic development, Gerry 
Brownlee, and the prime minister 
and tourism minister, John Key, the 
government agreed on 27 October 
to promote special legislation in 
Parliament specifying that film 
workers were contractors and could 
not demand a collective agreement 
or take strike action. The legislation 
passed. The deal also gave Warners 
up to $34 million in tax concessions. 
 The deal did have a large 
national interest component in 
work, business opportunities and 
promotional benefits. It included 
a commitment that all DVDs of 
the films would include a tourism 
promotion video. Nevertheless, it 
prompted criticism that the law had 
been changed to meet the demands 
of an individual company – a 
response at odds with the post-1984 
principle. Professor Paul Roth of 
Otago University, an academic 
specialising in employment law, said 
the deal was a case of New Zealand 
‘teetering into third world status’ 
(quoted	in	McLean,	2010,	etc).	It	also	
clearly disadvantaged the particular 
employees affected and, if replicated 
elsewhere, would disadvantage 
employees generally. 
 This was a case of specific 
concessions to a firm in return for it 
spending money here. 
•	 In	legislation	promulgated	in	late	
2010, successful bidders for contracts 
to build fibre networks for the 
ultra-fast broadband project were 
granted a period of eight and a half 
years during which the Commerce 
Commission (the regulator of the 
telecommunications sector) could 
not inquire into, or order changes 
to, the terms under which retailers 
of broadband services could access 
the fibre. Since Telecom’s network 
arm, Chorus, was expected to, and 
eventually did, win most of the 
network building contracts, this 
was seen by competitors, retailers, 
consumers and all political parties 
other than National as potentially 
giving Chorus near-monopoly rents, 
and this unusual alliance successfully 
campaigned	through	March–May	
2011 to have the ‘regulatory holiday’ 
removed – though the government 
did still guarantee that fibre builders 
would not be out of pocket if the 
Commerce Commission did order 
cuts in access terms. 
 The ultra-fast broadband 
project is in effect a public-private 
partnership (PPP) between the 
government-owned Crown Fibre 
Holdings and companies building the 
fibre network. PPPs typically involve 
a trade-off between the government 
and the private company to give the 
contracting company reasonable 
assurance that it will be able to 
operate profitably. 
•	 On	13	June	2011,	prime	minister	and	
tourism minister John Key, economic 
development minister David Carter 
and Auckland mayor Len Brown 
announced a deal with Sky City 
Entertainment under which Sky City 
would build a $350 million, 3,500-
seat convention centre in Auckland 
by 2015, in return for which the 
government would favourably 
consider additional gambling 
licences and/or an extension of its 
gambling licences beyond their 2021 
termination date. Sky City said the 
regulatory changes were needed to 
assure it of revenue in return for the 
risk it was taking. The government 
said it would get a convention centre, 
much needed for tourism, without 
having to stump up money itself. 
 This prompted criticism that 
gambling licences were for sale to 
a favoured company. Key said the 
additional licences would not worsen 
problem gambling because it would 
be foreigners who did the gambling, 
and that the changes would be 
subject to ‘full public submissions’ 
because additional licences needed a 
change to the Gambling Act, which 
imposed a moratorium on casinos. 
A subsequent Audit Office report 
faulted	officials	in	the	Ministry	of	
Economic Development for not 
following strict tendering rules. 
(Other critics said the deal added to 
the risk of more gambling addiction 
or just more gambling, and more 
individual and societal cost.) 
The message from these examples 
was that rules can be bent if the deal is 
attractive enough and if you can get the 
Powerful interests can also afford to employ 
lobbyists, either in-house or from a consultancy, 
though the easy access to senior ministers and 
officials in New Zealand make this less important 
than in larger countries.
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ear of the prime minister or other senior 
ministers. 
In each case it could be, and was, 
argued that there was national economic 
benefit:
•	 jobs	and	associated	spending	and	
promotional benefits flowed from the 
Hobbit deal;
•	 the	country’s	businesses	and	
consumers will benefit from the 
broadband roll-out as they did from 
railways and the telegraph; 
•	 the	country	gets	a	convention	
centre which will bring high-
spending international conferences 
to Auckland, benefiting transport, 
accommodation and other businesses 
and potentially generating more 
– to which might be added the particular 
circumstances of a small country, where 
some projects can be achieved only by 
joint action by the government and a 
private firm. But the economic benefit was 
at the cost of favouring powerful interests 
– ‘concentrated interests’ –which could 
get the ear of politicians. This is injurious 
to the general public interest (as defined 
above) in the sense that a rules-based 
system is an important protection of the 
individual interests of those who do not 
have power; that is, ‘dispersed interests’. 
The obvious parallel is New Zealand’s 
often-expressed interest in, and need of, 
a rules-based international order, since 
New Zealand is a very small nation-state 
with negligible military and economic 
strength.  
Powerful interests can also afford to 
employ lobbyists, either in-house or from 
a consultancy, though the easy access 
to senior ministers and officials in New 
Zealand make this less important than 
in larger countries. They can also afford 
expensive legal actions, which can ‘burn 
off ’ less-powerful and wealthy opponents. 
There are also documented examples in 
the United States of academics writing 
research papers for payment for drug 
companies and companies opposing 
action on climate change, thereby 
manipulating public opinion. Debatable 
examples of such powerful interests are 
those who make and market alcoholic 
drinks, and fatty and sugary drinks and 
food. Some academics say these interests 
are too influential with politicians and 
block legislation aimed at reducing the 
damaging effects of their products on 
some people. The companies argue that 
the science is not clear (unlike with 
smoking), and that in any case to block 
access or artificially raise prices through 
taxes or price control would penalise 
those who use the products in moderation 
for pleasure, and interfere with personal 
freedoms, an important ingredient of 
a democracy. Gambling attracts similar 
contests of views. 
To these examples of successful 
pursuit of special interests might be 
added the influence in New Zealand of 
Federated Farmers, which persuaded 
the government to postpone indefinitely 
agriculture’s inclusion in the greenhouse 
gas emissions trading scheme, and whose 
farmer-members are the beneficiaries of 
a decision to use some of the proceeds of 
the partial sales of state-owned enterprises 
to seed investment in water storage dams 
to provide more water for irrigation 
(though it can also be argued that this 
can enable more efficient use of river 
water, and thus, if there is no additional 
allocation, limit the take from aquifers). 
In all these cases, those special 
interests would be treated differently by a 
government made up of the Labour Party 
and the Greens. 
Some also argue that the pursuit of 
apparently altruistic interests can result in 
injury to the general public interest in the 
sense of manufacturing a substantial new 
inequality, or maintaining or exacerbating 
a substantial existing inequality: for 
example, environmental interest groups 
campaigning against certain economic 
activities, where a successful campaign 
would result in the loss of jobs.  
Do some special interests have a back-
door route to influence? Government 
departments and other agencies routinely 
deal with special interests in the form 
of ‘stakeholders’ to ensure that policies 
and programmes are workable, and 
take into account those whom policies 
and programmes most affect. This is 
unexceptional if any adjustments to 
policy or programmes are made in line 
with national interest criteria. But there is 
a risk of capture. 
The self-reinforcing loop 
In	 the	 strict	 version	 of	Mulgan’s	‘market	
liberal’ model the special interest pursued 
is theoretical or principled or ideological, 
and usually argued on the grounds that 
the resultant policies are in the national 
interest. Nevertheless, if successful this 
can result in a privileged class or caste 
emerging which has a special interest in 
upholding the theory/principle/ideology. 
A loop can develop in which those whom 
a set of policies advantages can ensure 
that the policies are not overturned or, 
instead, are reinforced. This is common 
in autocratic states. In the Soviet Union a 
privileged oligarchy was able to pass on its 
privileges to progeny because of its hold 
on power. The ruling Communist Party 
in China maintains power despite deep 
changes in the ideological orthodoxy. 
Some argue that a modified version 
of	 Mulgan’s	 ‘market	 liberal’	 model	 was	
developed in Anglo-American countries 
over the past 30 years. A set of theories 
arguing for ‘more market’ or a new 
‘market liberalism’, ascribing primacy to 
market mechanisms over government 
regulation and action, gained enough 
adherents to influence and/or command 
cabinets and legislatures in Britain, the 
In the strict version of Mulgan’s ‘market liberal’ 
model the special interest pursued is theoretical 
or principled or ideological, and usually argued on 
the grounds that the resultant policies are in the 
national interest.
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United States, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand, and over time to varying degrees 
in other countries. The beneficiaries of 
the policies had the connectedness and 
wherewithal to lobby successfully to keep 
the policies in place, despite changes in 
the party composition of governments. 
This created a self-reinforcing loop which 
largely survived even the global financial 
crisis precipitated by the crash of the 
lightly-regulated US banking system in 
2008. 
Market	 liberalism	 over	 time	 became	
the orthodoxy, even under centre-left 
governments, in part through promotion 
and in part through adaptation and 
acquiescence. This kept the influence 
loop	 in	 place.	A	 paper	 by	Martin	Gilens	
and Benjamin Page (Gilens and Page, 
2014), as reviewed in the market-liberal 
Economist magazine (Economist, 2014), 
found ‘a vicious cycle in which politicians 
adopt policies that favour the better-off; 
this gives the wealthy more money with 
which to lobby politicians, which leads 
to more favourable legislation and so on. 
The surge in inequality over the last 30 
years could perhaps be attributed, in part, 
to this process.’ The paper found that ‘if a 
proposed policy change had low support 
among the wealthy (one in five in favour) 
the policy was adopted about 18% of 
the time. When four in five wealthy 
people supported a plan, the prospects 
for adoption rose to 45%.’ Alan Kohler, 
a conservative commentator at the 
Australian Business Spectator, has written 
that ‘the two great vested interests of the 
modern world are American bankers and 
the Chinese Communist Party’ (Kohler, 
2013). The Gilens paper was interpreted 
in the media as concluding that the 
United States is an oligarchy. 
In effect, the creation of an oligarchic 
loop amounts to capture of the policy-
making process, and in that process the 
creation of ‘rents’: that is, returns from 
investments or labour in excess of what a 
market free of policy and other distortions 
would deliver. This clearly amounts to 
the manufacture of an inequality which 
can be substantial. 
It might be argued that a milder 
version of this has applied in New Zealand. 
Political parties depend on donations for 
their operational and campaign funding. 
Businesses are the biggest donors to 
the National and Labour parties, and 
in this election cycle the Greens have 
been shown to have similarly benefited 
from a ‘green’ business donor. All three 
parties insist they do not make policy 
adjustments in response to specific 
donations. The National Party’s practice 
is that all such donations are made to 
the	 party	 organisation	 and	MPs	 are	 not	
notified. Some businesses have a policy 
of making donations to all significant 
political parties. But businesses do pick 
and choose. The National Party’s general 
policy line favouring business coincides 
with higher donations from business 
than are made to other parties. Some 
of the Labour Party’s bigger business 
donors are those who would benefit from 
Labour’s industry policies. Labour also 
receives significant funding from unions, 
which reflects both the party’s origins in 
the labour movement and consequent 
special constitutional rights for unions, 
and its pro-union labour relations policy. 
The Conservative Party was formed by a 
wealthy businessman. 
Whether this form of funding of 
political parties reflects the influence 
of injurious special interests is a matter 
for debate. Donor Sky City did benefit 
from ministerial adjustment of a tender 
process, but there is no evidence that that 
was the result of its donation, as distinct 
from its proposition just happening to 
fit well with ministers’ aims to expand 
tourism. 
It can be argued that the much 
higher proportion of children of 
tertiary-educated parents who go on to 
tertiary education than of the children 
of less-educated people is a loop. The 
well-educated are disproportionately 
represented in major political parties, 
and can influence policy – including, for 
example, interest-free loans for students. 
One way in which an oligarchic loop 
can develop is through the advantage 
that a relatively small, well-organised, 
well-connected, well-financed and tightly 
focused (‘concentrated’) interest group 
with much to gain from a policy or set 
of policies (a special tariff, for example, 
or lower top marginal or company tax 
rate) has over ‘dispersed’ interests – the 
large numbers of unorganised people 
who individually have less to lose (or to 
gain) and for whom the transaction costs 
of mobilisation are greater. 
Are there also examples in New 
Zealand of group special interests 
winning office to press the case? Some 
cite the Canterbury Regional Council’s 
impasse over water allocation and control: 
some councillors wanted more control 
to combat contamination of waterways 
and draining of aquifers, which was 
affecting city water; others, representing 
farmers, opposed that. In the opinion of 
one who was involved, farmers became 
concerned that they would be out-
voted after the 2010 elections, and the 
government replaced the councillors with 
commissioners. It is beyond the scope of 
this article, however, to make a detailed 
analysis of this event.  
There does not appear to be any 
evidence in New Zealand of payment of 
MPs	 to	 represent	 or	 speak	 on	 behalf	 of	
interest groups, and there is no evidence 
that parties have been ‘captured’ by an 
interest group as a result of the presence 
of a former activist for that group. 
Excessive pursuit of special interests to the point 
that they are injurious to the general public 
interest can lead to damaging political or other 
reaction which negates the gains won by pressing 
those interests, and in doing that may lower 
general welfare.
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The risk to the winners
Excessive pursuit of special interests to the 
point that they are injurious to the general 
public interest can lead to damaging 
political or other reaction which negates 
the gains won by pressing those interests, 
and in doing that may lower general 
welfare. A recent New Zealand example 
may have been the hard line taken by 
Federated Farmers against inclusion in the 
greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, 
and against proposals for firm measures 
to reduce fertiliser run-off pollution of 
waterways. Fish and Game New Zealand, 
the pressure group for recreational fishers 
and hunters, labelled this ‘dirty dairying’, 
a phrase which caught on and may have 
contributed to firming up public opinion 
against dairy farmers and for stronger 
measures. 
More	 broadly,	 the	 embedding	 of	
high income and wealth inequalities by 
the success of the oligarchic loop may 
in time provoke a populist response 
which rolls back the loop’s influence and 
gains. Populism is seldom rational and 
coherent. 
Prevention and reversal
Prevention of the oligarchic loop requires 
a strong, rules-based system which takes 
account of the interests of the least and less 
powerful. Exposure and reversal require 
strong institutions, a rules-based system, 
and rigour in policy-making and political 
decision-making and in the operations of 
government departments and agencies to 
prevent capture and resultant rents. 
One institutional dimension is 
transparency: sunlight is the best 
disinfectant. This focuses on roles of 
the media, the parliamentary process 
and the three parliamentary officers, the 
auditor-general, the ombudsman and 
the parliamentary commissioner for the 
environment, who can speak on behalf 
of ‘dispersed interests’. To these might 
be added the Office of the Children’s 
Commissioner. Some think, though some 
doubt, that a register of lobbyists would 
help. In all cases there are examples of 
strong sunlight but also some clouds. 
Another relevant institution is the 
Commerce Commission, which has 
multiple roles, including controlling 
monopolies and setting pricing 
parameters for oligopolies, finding and 
fining cartels, and inquiring into and 
putting a stop to excessive exploitation of 
market power to disadvantage consumers 
and suppliers. Other channels are courts; 
citizens’ campaigns; protests and petitions’ 
citizens-initiated referendums (though 
none have been acted on so far); a citizens 
assembly or jury (tried in Canada and 
Ireland but not yet in New Zealand); 
collaborative governance, as through the 
Land and Water Forum, involving 59 
interest groups, which produced 
consensus on the foundations of water 
policy; working groups involving experts; 
and electronic channels for consultation 
and feedback. (Fuller discussion is 
contained in the note on which this 
article is based.) 
In summary
The cornerstone criterion by which 
pursuit of a special interest is judged to 
be injurious to the general public interest 
is whether it manufactures a substantial 
inequality or maintains or exacerbates 
an existing substantial, manufactured 
inequality. That the level of income and 
wealth inequality is high in New Zealand 
and has risen greatly since the 1980s, and 
so has put full citizenship beyond the reach 
of large numbers of citizens, suggests that 
the level of successful pursuit of injurious 
special interests has also been high, at least 
in the sense of a loop having developed 
which generates and protects policies that 
benefit those who have already benefited. 
Within that loop there are examples of 
specific injurious interests. That suggests 
that there is cause for an informed and 
comprehensive inquiry and a programme 
of action, aimed at each citizen having full, 
equal membership of society, the essence 
of a democracy. 
1 This article abridges a note posted at http://igps.victoria.
ac.nz/Vested%20Interest%20Paper.pdf. 
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